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ALTERNATIVE FORUM: A COLORADO FARMER
AND THE ITC’S EXCELLENT ADVENTURE
Brady P. Gleason+
Thanks to the legalization of marijuana in certain U.S. jurisdictions, marijuana
is now arguably a legitimate article of commerce. This Essay explores the
implication of this development as it relates to potential proceedings before the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). Specifically, this Essay aims to
ascertain whether the ITC, via the agency’s section 337 investigatory and
remedial authorities, may regulate marijuana that has been imported into the
United States.1
Determining standing at the ITC is purely a statutory analysis.2 As one can
imagine, however, such an inquiry is largely fact dependent.3 Proceeding to
ascertain the potential of section 337 to regulate marijuana, therefore, would
seem rather detached or uninspired without at least surmising a narrative. To
illustrate how section 337 might be useful to marijuana farmers in the United
States, let us consider the following scenario.
I. THE FARMERS’ STORY
Bill and Ted own a large tract of farmland in Colorado. In 2012, by popular
referendum, Colorado approved a constitutional amendment legalizing the sale
and use of marijuana.4 Hoping to take advantage of recent legislation, Bill and
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.,
2011, Clemson University. The author would like to thank and his friends and family for their love
and support and his colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their hard work in editing
this Essay.
1. The purpose of this Essay is neither to promote nor discourage the decriminalization or
legalization of marijuana, nor is it intended to endorse a particular stance on this contentious issue.
Rather, this Essay identifies merely the existence of a locally recognized marijuana industry in
select jurisdictions and hypothesizes that such a change in status may have an unexpected legal
ramification.
2. See Daniel E. Valencia, Appeals from the International Trade Commission: What
Standing Requirement?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1171, 1174 (2012); see also Merritt Blakeslee
and Scott Daniels, Do you have what it takes to bring suit at the ITC? — Standing and the ITC’s
domestic industry requirement, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2010/08/24/itc-standing-domestic-industry-requirement/id=12264/.
3. See Valencia, supra note 2, at 1174. The broad statutory language leaves considerable
room for interpretation and “[a]lthough there is no clear rule regarding the extent of the standing
requirement, several key observations can be made from several recent Federal Circuit decisions .
. . .” Id.
4. See Angela Macdonald, Why Marijuana Is Not Regulated Like Alcohol in Colorado: A
Warning for States Seeking to Legalize Recreational Marijuana, 2015 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 1, 1–
2 (2015); see also 60 Minutes: The Marijuana Effect (CBS television broadcast Jan. 11, 2015),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-pot-marijuana-60-minutes/.
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Ted decide to dedicate a portion of acreage to the cultivation and harvesting of
marijuana. In doing so, Bill and Ted assent to several compliance and licensing
regulations imposed by the state.5 Bill and Ted must reside in Colorado for at
least two years prior to applying for the license.6 Bill and Ted are required to
maintain detailed inventory records,7 comply with mandated security measures,8
install video surveillance,9 and verify customer eligibility.10 Bill and Ted, in
light of the federal government’s ongoing prohibition of marijuana, will
continue to operate under a canopy of legal uncertainty, fearing federal
prosecution. 11 Further, Bill and Ted struggle to find legal representation as
many attorneys fear ethical repercussions in representing a business enterprise
in violation of federal law.12 Bill and Ted may also find it difficult to secure
bank loans and investors, as banks and other lending services tend to steer clear
of marijuana operations. 13 Furthermore, Bill and Ted are forced to operate

5. See Dion Rabouin, Colorado Marijuana Legalization 2015: Fighting the Black Market
and the Everyday Challenges of Selling Legal Weed, IB TIMES (May 18, 2015, 3:22 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/pulse/colorado-marijuana-legalization-2015-fighting-black-marketeveryday-challenges-1913431 (quoting a local marijuana farmer, who exclaimed that “[t]here’s,
like, 200 pages of laws and rules. I can’t really iterate it all. There’s a monthly update and
compliance officers; you’re expected to be caught up on anything that’s been laid out as law up
until a certain time and then from that time forward they’re basically updating, monthly, the changes
that are happening in the industry.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4-306 (West 2015) (listing
some of the statutory preconditions for engaging in the marijuana business, including that an owner
must live in Colorado for two full years before applying for a license, be above age twenty-one,
and not have discharged a felony conviction in the five years prior to applying).
6. See § 12-43.4-306(k); Silvia Irimescu, Marijuana Legalization: How Government
Stagnation Hinders Legal Evolution and Harms A Nation, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 241, 262 (2015)
(citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1(M)100 (2014)); Macdonald, supra note 4, at 20.
7. See Irimescu, supra note 6, at 262 (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1(M)309 (2014)).
8. See id. (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1(M)305).
9. See id. (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1(M)306).
10. See id. (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1(M)405(C)).
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance
under federal law); Kimberly A. Houser, What Inconsistent Federal Policy Means for Marijuana
Business Owners: Washington’s I-502 and the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 50 GONZ. L.
REV. 305, 323-24 (2015) (highlighting the “Kettle Falls Five” case wherein a U.S. Attorney
prosecuted a group of citizens operating legally under Washington state law).
12. See Helia Garrido Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics in the
Movement to Legalize Marijuana, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 333, 349 (2014).
13. See Ioan Grillo, U.S. Legalization of Marijuana Has Hit Mexican Cartels’ Cross-Border
Trade, TIME (Apr. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3801889/us-legalization-marijuana-trade/ (noting that
the discrepancy between state and federal law creates difficulties raising capital from investors as
well as soliciting financial services in general); Macdonald, supra note 4, at 23–25, fig. 4 (noting
that, when compared with licensing fees assigned to alcohol dispensaries, the fees associated with
selling and cultivating marijuana appear structured to favor large producers over smaller microgrowers).
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almost entirely unbanked and cannot deduct costs typically associated with usual
business expenses, such as farming equipment, rent, and payroll.14
In navigating these bureaucratic waters, Bill and Ted run the continued risk
of abrupt political change, 15 personal liability, 16 fiscal uncertainty, and
encountering conflicts with federal law.17 Nevertheless, Bill and Ted embrace
the risk, internalize the costs, and comply with each and every costly regulation.
Unfortunately—depending on one’s perspective—instituting costly business
practices to conform to government regulations, coupled with financial
difficulties securing loans and a disadvantaged tax position, flows downstream
to the customer.18 Capitalistic in disposition, the customer seeks the lowest price
and, given the only contemporaneous development of legalization, many

14. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62
UCLA L. REV. 74, 91–94 (2015).
15. See Eliza Collins, Chris Christie Doubles Down on Marijuana Comments, POLITICO (July
29, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/chris-christie-enforce-marijuanaillegal-2016-120769 (stating that “[i]n a Chris Christie administration, there would be no such thing
as legal marijuana use”).
16. See Mishan Wroe, Growing Concerns: Marijuana Industry Hit with Its First Ever Product
Liability Lawsuit, NAT. L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/growingconcerns-marijuana-industry-hit-its-first-ever-product-liability-lawsuit (reporting the first product
liability law suit filed against a Colorado marijuana production company).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012); Grillo, supra note 13 (suggesting that because federal law
prohibits marijuana, marijuana farmers have difficulty banking and securing investors); The
Marijuana Effect, supra note 4 (quoting Meg Sanders, a Colorado grower, who states that “[a]s
long as the federal government continues to count pot proceeds as illegal drug money, most banks
won’t touch it”).
18. See generally Greg Jericho, Gee, Westpac Must Have Thought Hard About Passing on
the Cost of Regulation to Customers, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2015, 8:58 PM), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/grogonomics/2015/oct/15/westpac-to-pass-on-cost-of-regulation-tocustomers-despite-profit-increase (explaining that a common practice among businesses is to pass
the costs of regulation on to customers); see also Deborah Camiel, Underground Weed: Colorado’s
Black Market, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.cnbcprime.com/marijuana/video/pot-afterhours-the-black-market/ (explaining that black market marijuana sells at a lower cost).
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marijuana customers are likely not as fearful of the black market as other
retailers.19 As such, the black market has survived.20
That is not to say that the black market is not shrinking. Approximately sixty
percent of marijuana sold in Colorado is grown legally.21 The black market will
only continue to dwindle as advancements in technology empower greater
regulatory oversight.22 Nevertheless, as former Colorado Attorney General John
Suthers reported, the presence of Mexican drug trafficking groups in the
Colorado marijuana market persists.23
One day, when an unknown competitor undercuts their product and they lose
out on a large sale, Bill and Ted begin to suspect a foreign marijuana producer
has infiltrated their usual market. They reach out to a fellow licensed farmer,
who insinuates that Mexican drug cartels indeed have permeated their market.
The presence of cheaper, unregulated imported marijuana not only threatens Bill
and Ted’s bottom line, but also threatens the legitimacy of their chosen trade,
and serves to only reinforce the antagonistic tone of those opposing marijuana
legalization.24 Bill and Ted, interminable enthusiasts of marijuana culture and
19. See Laura Graham, Legalizing Marijuana in the Shadows of International Law: The
Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington Models, 33 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 158 (2015) (suggesting that
the DOJ anticipates that black market marijuana will remain a problem after legalization); Emily
Gray Brosious, Colorado’s Marijuana Black Market is Thriving Despite Legalization, SUN TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2015, 12:53 PM), http://extract.suntimes.com/news/10/153/3427/colorado-marijuanablack-market-legalization; Rafa Fernandez De Castro, How Mexican Drug Cartels are Reacting to
Marijuana Legalization in the U.S., FUSHION (Mar. 23, 2015, 7:43 PM), http://fusion.net/
story/108575/how-mexican-drug-cartels-are-reacting-to-marijuana-legalization-in-the-u-s/
(interviewing Mexican security analyst Alejandro Hope, who states that “there’s still a market niche
for Mexico’s lower-end drug trade weed, since legal marijuana in states like Washington and
Colorado is more expensive”); Kirk Siegler, Colorado’s Pot Industry Looks To Move Past
Stereotypes, NPR (Dec. 2, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/02/367767955/coloradospot-industry-looks-to-move-past-stereotypes (noting the concern held by some business owners
that the black market may threaten the legitimacy of the marijuana industry).
20. See The Marijuana Effect, supra note 4 (interviewing Greenwood Village Police Chief
John Jackson, president of the Colorado Association of Chiefs of Police, who states that “[t]here’s
a common belief that by legalizing it, you will get rid of the black market. I can resoundingly say
that the black market is alive and doing well.”).
21. Camiel, supra note 18.
22. See Siegler, supra note 19; see also, Jacob Sullum, This Is What Legalizing Marijuana
Did to the Black Market in Colorado, REASON.COM (Nov. 2014), http://reason.com/archives/
2014/10/30/the-lingering-black-market (predicting that the black market will decline as production
streamlines and prices decrease).
23. See Camiel, supra note 18. While the U.S. Border Patrol noticed a precipitous drop in the
amount of marijuana being smuggled across the boarder, they still reported confiscating
approximately 664 tons of cannabis in 2014. See Grillo, supra note 13.
24. See Andrés E. Muñoz, Blunt the Violence: How Legal Marijuana Regulation in the United
States Can Help End the Cartel Violence in Mexico, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 691, 695 (2014)
(stating that the marijuana legalization “movement . . . is still young, and many states and the federal
government refuse to even consider this type of legislation for a variety of reasons”); see also
Seigler, supra 19 (noting that unregulated market players have a considerable impact on industry
stability).
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proponents of legalization, have more than a mere political interest; they have a
profound financial interest.
Upon investigating the merit of their colleague’s allegation, Bill and Ted’s
worst fears are realized: a Mexican drug cartel has invaded their market, and Bill
and Ted face considerable loss if the cartel’s presence is not eradicated. What
are Bill and Ted to do now that their product is being undercut by unregulated,
and therefore cheaper, imported marijuana?
Bill and Ted could alert the authorities of the continuing criminal violation,
hoping to precipitate the commencement of criminal proceedings.25 In doing so,
a local district attorney would precede on their behalf.26 Such a path, however,
deprives Bill and Ted of any direct control over their cause of action and fails to
compensate them for their financial loss.
Bill and Ted could also initiate a civil action, availing themselves to both
monetary remedies and control over the cause of action. The wheels of justice,
however, often unfortunately turn rather slow on the civil side of a court’s
docket. Difficult questions of jurisdiction may further distract and delay relief,
and recalling the financial difficulties associated with operating a business the
federal government classifies as criminal, one can easily recognize why
proceeding through the civil court system may be less than ideal economically.27
These concerns are especially problematic as marijuana businesses continue to
struggle to find legal representation.28
This is not to say standard criminal and civil proceedings have no benefit to
Bill and Ted. In fact, both forums stand presently as the anticipated forum and
a favorable decision in either obviously benefits Bill and Ted. There, however,
is another potential forum for Bill and Ted. Somewhat paradoxically, the
alternative forum may be a federal agency.
II. THE ITC: JUSTICIABILITY AND DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
Established in 1916, the ITC operates as a quasi-judicial independent federal
agency. 29 The agency’s initial undertaking was to investigate unfair trade
competition in conjunction with United States custom laws.30 Section 337 of

25. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2012). This federal legislation
proscribes marijuana possession and distribution. Id.
26. See supra note 11–12 and accompanying text.
27. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at Part II (discussing the potential difficulties
stemming from the federal prohibition of marijuana).
28. Id. at 95.
29. See Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and
Extraterritoriality, 66 ALA. L. REV. 63, 83 (2014).
30. See id. (quoting Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, title VII, §§ 702, 704, 39 Stat. 795, 796).
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the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, since codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1337, functions as
the Commission’s organic statute for unfair trade investigations.31
The statute’s language, broadly drafted, grants the Commission expansive
investigative and remedial powers. 32 Over time, statutory tinkering,
technological advancements, and economic globalization have rendered the
Commission a burgeoning source of adjudicative relief.33
Section 337 prescribes the agency’s authority to adjudicate claims of unfair
trade practices,34 enumerates standing requirements,35 and identifies available
remedies.36 To obtain a remedy under subsection (a)(1)(A), a complainant must
demonstrate: (i) an unfair act or method of competition, in the (ii) importation
of an article, and (iii) “the threat or effect of which is to destroy or substantially
injure” an efficient and economically established domestic industry.37
A. A Violation of Section 337: An Unfair Act
It is rather clear, in examining the ITC’s organic statute, that section 337
embraces an incredibly broad mechanism, designed “to create and animate a
cause of action out of any ‘unfair act’ that is prohibited under U.S. law—state
or federal.”38 Since the days of the Tariff Commission, the precursor to the ITC,
the “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts” language “is broad and
inclusive,” designed to cover an expansive assortment of conduct.39 The statute

31. See Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions
Appealed from the ITC, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 249 (2010); see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (2012).
32. See Andrew R. Kopsidas, ITC Says it Has the Power to Stop Infringing Transmissions of
Digital Materials, FISH AND RICHARDSON: FISH’S LITIGATION BLOG (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.fr.com/fish-litigation/itc-says-it-has-the-power-to-stop-infringing-transmissions-ofdigital-materials/ (explaining that the ITC’s statutory authority gives it broad investigatory and
remedial powers); Lance, supra note 31, at 249.
33. See Cecilia H. Gonzalez et al., The Parallel Universes of the USITC & the District Courts,
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 167, 167–68 (2009); Valencia, supra note 2, at 1172.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2012).
35. See Valencia, supra note 2, at 1175 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2012)) (stating that “[b]y
statute, the ITC’s ‘jurisdiction’ derives from unfair acts in the importation, sale for importation, or
sale after importation of articles that infringe U.S. patents”).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)–(g).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
38. Jonathan J. Engler, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930: A Private Right-of-Action to
Enforce Ocean Wildlife Conservation Laws?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10513, 10514 (2010),
http://www.adduci.com/sites/default/files/2010-05-00%20Wildlife%20Conservation%20
(JJE).pdf.
39. Jay H. Reiziss, The Distinctive Characteristics of Section 337, 8 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 234 (2009) (citing In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 443 (C.C.P.A. 1955)).
In fact, because the ITC is provided “great latitude in deciding what constitutes ‘unfair methods of
competition’ or ‘unfair acts in importation,’” the scope of the agency’s subject mater jurisdiction is
much broader than that of the federal courts. See id. at 235–36; see also Engler, supra note 38, at
10514.
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underwent occasional modifications throughout the twentieth century, but
retained largely the original language.40
1. Two Subsections of Unfair Acts
A typical violation of section 337 today arises in the context of the importation
of an infringing article; the “unfair act” is the act of importing the infringing
article.41 It should be noted, however, that the term “unfair act” has never been
tied exclusively to pure violations of intellectual property exclusivity rights.42
Prior to 1988, the establishment of an “unfair act” encompassed patent
infringement, but evidence of infringement alone failed to satisfy the unfair trade
practices prong. 43 A violation existed, rather, when certain economic
circumstances resulted from an unfair act—i.e. the statute tied the alleged unfair
act to economic impact on a particular domestic industry.44 Only then were the
unique remedies available in a section 337 investigation justified. Positioning
the violation threshold predominantly in terms of the harm to the relevant
domestic industry, rather than from the existence of an infringement itself,
allowed the ITC to compliment the role of the federal courts.45
Section 337 analysis, post-1988, bifurcated the original unfair trade practices
that had an “effect . . . to destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United
States,” from a newly unfair acts prong, based entirely upon intellectual property
rights. 46 The new intellectual property prong, codified in 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(1)(B), now considers as an “unfair act” the mere importation of an
infringing article.47 A domestic industry still must be proven to exist, or in the
process of coming into existence, but there is no resulting injury to that industry
nexus limitation in subsection (a)(1)(B). 48 The amended statute—under 19

40. See Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 29, at 86. For examples of past amendments to 19
U.S.C. § 1337, see Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-416, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980); Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-686, 72 Stat. 673 (1958).
41. See Jacqueline Lee, Is the U.S. International Trade Commission Protectionist? A
Comparative Study of Border Enforcement Measures, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 593, 627 (2012) (noting that
the majority of recent investigations undertaken by the ITC relate to patent infringement).
42. See Engler, supra note 38, at 10514–15.
43. See Allen M. Sokal & Joyce Craig, Federal Circuit Discards the “Nexus” Test for
Infringement at the ITC, Potentially Narrowing the Scope and Effectiveness of § 337, 41 AIPLA
Q.J. 637, 640-48 (2013); see also Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 29, at 79–81.
44. Sokal & Craig, supra note 43, at 640.
45. Id.; see Lee, supra note 41, at 625.
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
47. Anne L. Spangler, Intellectual Property Protection and Import Trade: Making Section
337 Consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 229
(1991); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B).
48. See Jose M. Recio, A Change in Establishing the Domestic Industry Requirement at the
International Trade Commission, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 131, 133 (2011).
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U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)—retains the antecedent interconnected unfair act
coupled with economic harm analysis.49
i. Returning to the Farm(ers): Possibility of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)
Violations
Recalling the pre-1988 inquiry’s focus on economic harm to a domestic
industry, the ITC investigated traditionally injuries related to: “lost sales,
declining domestic production, declining profits, loss of royalties, competition
between the domestic product and the imported infringing product, and
increased import and sale of infringing goods.”50 When these “injuries caused
the domestic industry to lower its prices, reduce its employment, or lose potential
or actual sales,” a successful complainant was entitled to relief.51
Under subsection (a)(1)(A) and its statutory predecessors, the ITC’s section
337 jurisprudence extends to false designation of original source actions,52 and
business torts such as false advertising,53 tortious interference with contractual
and customer relations,54 product disparagement,55 and fraudulent inducement
to enter into a license.56 How does this relate to our farmers Bill and Ted?
Bill and Ted can declare that their industry is being injured by the unfair acts
of a foreign drug cartel that has infiltrated the Colorado market with an inferior
quality and lower priced crop; they can then be joined by similarly situated
Colorado marijuana farmers, and submit a complaint that identifies the illicit
importation practices in violation of federal and state law.57 In support of their
complaint, documents and economic records delineating the resulting harm may
also be submitted.58

49. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
50. Spangler, supra note 47, at 228.
51. Id.
52. William P. Atkins, Appreciating 337 Actions at the ITC: A Primer on Intellectual
Property Issues and Procedures at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 5 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 103, 105 (1997) (referencing In re Certain Plastic Food Storage Containers, Inv. No.
337-TA-152 (ITC 1984)); In re Certain Caulking Guns, Inv. No. 337-TA-139 (ITC 1984)).
53. Id. at 105–06 (referencing In re Certain Power Woodworking Tools, Their Parts,
Accessories and Special Purpose Tools, Inv. No. 337-TA-115 (ITC 1982)).
54. Id. (referencing In re Certain Electrically Resistive Monocomponent Toner and “Black
Powder” Preparations Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-253 (ITC 1988); In re Certain Floppy Disk Drives
and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-203 (ITC 1985); In re Certain Power Woodworking
Tools, Their Parts, Accessories and Special Purpose Tools, Inv. No. 337-TA-115 (ITC 1982)).
55. Id. (referencing In re Certain Fluidized Bed Combustion Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-213
(ITC 1985); In re Certain Axes, Inv. No. 337-TA-113 (ITC 1983)).
56. Id. (referencing In re Certain Fluidized Bed Combustion Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-213
(ITC 1985)).
57. See supra note 38–39 and accompanying text; see also Colleen V. Chien, Protecting
Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 177 (2011)
(explaining that some cases before the ITC involve more than one, or even groups of plaintiffs).
58. See Engler, supra note 38, at 10513.
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At the complaint’s core, Bill and Ted’s marijuana distribution is in direct
competition with the unregulated foreign product. The foreign enterprise
circumvents costly regulation and can sell its crop at a lower cost. Bill and Ted’s
domestic industry will suffer economic harm as a result.
In addition to the Cartel’s unfair presence in the market, depending on the
particular conduct of the foreign drug cartels, specific business torts and claims
of false designation of original source could constitute the requisite “unfair
act.”59 Considering the belief that Colorado marijuana has surpassed Mexican
marijuana in terms of industry quality, coupled with strict state regulation of
packaging and crop identification, one can easily imagine actions giving rise to
allegations of purposeful misleading of crop origin, various packaging state
violations, and customer confusion.60 Moreover, given the market pressures and
the Mexican Cartel’s violent propensity, some Coloradoans fear extortion and
tactics constituting other business torts.61
Even in the absence of such specific conduct, the inherent unfairness of
binding local farmers to expensive regulations—a cost not internalized by black
market importers—should trigger subsection (a)(1)(A). 62
The unfair
competition would force Bill and Ted to lower their prices, which reduces profit.
The two cannot reinvest in their farm, they cannot expand their business, they
struggle to find business partners, they may be forced to reduce their operation
by terminating employees, or even close. In the presence of clear unfair acts and
resulting economic harm, the expansive nature of the section 337 justiciability
boundaries should encompass a claim under subsection (a)(1)(A) brought
against a foreign drug cartel importing marijuana into Colorado.63

59. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
60. See Elana Rodman, From Criminalization to Regulation: New Classifications of
Cannabis Necessitate Reform of United Nations Drug Treaties, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 647, 663
(2015) (citing COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 (2015)); What’s the Preferred Weed? Mexican or
American?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-domarijuana-smokers-like-better-mexican-or-american/ (stating that the United States and Europe has
supplanted Mexico as the “gold standard” for marijuana aficionados).
61. See Marijuana Legalization Raises Fears of Drug Cartels, HERE & NOW (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/02/21/marijuana-drug-cartels (interviewing Tom Gorman, who
believes legalization will shift the Mexican Cartel’s focus to extorting Colorado marijuana
businesses).
62. See Engler, supra note 38, at 10515 (suggesting that, where domestic fishing fleets are
internalizing regulatory costs while international fleets ignore them, fish caught in violation of
international treaties should trigger section 337 remedial relief).
63. See id. at 10514 (recalling that section 337 embraces an incredibly broad mechanism,
designed “to create and animate a cause of action out of any ‘unfair act’ that is prohibited under
U.S. law—state or federal”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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ii. Intellectual Property Prong: Possibility of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)
Violations
Recalling the pivot in analysis under the intellectual property prong of section
337—that a violation arises not through an unfair act interconnected with a
particular economic harm analysis—an “unfair act” is assumed harmful to a
domestic industry if importation of an infringing article is discovered. 64
Accordingly, all that is required under subsection (a)(1)(B) is an identifiable
intellectual property right and the infringing nature of the imported article.65
This subsection is triggered upon the importation of articles into the United
States that “infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and
enforceable United States copyright . . . or are made, produced, processed, or
mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and
enforceable United States patent.”66 Subsection (a)(1)(C) elaborates restrictions
on the importation “of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States
trademark registered.”67
Returning to Bill and Ted, imagine if the duo invested considerable time and
money and were able to genetically engineer a new seed that sprouts what their
market considers to be the ideal marijuana strain. The exact process by which
the seeds are planted, maintained, and harvested is novel and nonobvious in the
industry, and particular machines are fashioned to assist in this unique
cultivation process. These particular methods and cultivation tools are essential
to maintaining the high quality of Bill and Ted’s strain. To promote the new
strain, Bill and Ted generate popular slogans and develop a brand name to
identify the source of the strain. Ted, an artist, designs an iconic and unique
label featuring his artwork.
The particular strain becomes a smashing commercial success, known
nationally as one of the highest quality strains, and Bill and Ted hope to guard
their investment by seeking various forms of intellectual property protection.68
Patents, considered the strongest form of intellectual property protection,
afford the owner the right to exclude; they prevent others from making, using,

64. See Sokal & Craig, supra note 43, at 640.
65. See Dong Woo Seo, Material Retardation Standard in the U.S. Antidumping Law, 24
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 835, 860 (1993) (stating that the 1988 Act removes such an injury
requirement in cases involving infringement of a patent, copyright, registered trademark, or mask
work; in these cases, proof of particular injury is not required, as long as the petitioner can show
that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established with regard to the intellectual
property right involved).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
67. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(C).
68. While identified as a public policy means of promoting the sciences and useful arts, the
“putative justification for intellectual property protection” is the economic incentive for inventors
to create and maximize monetization. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Fake It Till You Make It: A
Justification for Intellectual Property “Piracy”, 48 IND. L. REV. 65, 70 (2014).
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selling, or even offering to sell any patented invention.69 Some have speculated
that now that marijuana is legal within some jurisdictions and the fact that patent
law has minimal moral analytical components, 70 pending marijuana plant
patents may now be issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).71 At the very least, process or method claims specific to optimizing
marijuana cultivation, or even inventions not specific to marijuana but were used
in the production of marijuana, would be articles worthy of patent protection.
Given the popularity of Bill and Ted’s particular marijuana strain, it is entirely
plausible that a member of the Mexican Cartel would obtain Bill and Ted’s
marijuana crop, harvest the crop’s seeds, replant and reproduce the crop, and
attempt to sell a copied plant. If the USPTO were to begin issuing patents on
marijuana plants, and Bill and Ted were able to receive a patent on their plant,
such conduct could constitute patent infringement and trigger section 337 relief
under subsection (a)(1)(B).72 If Bill and Ted were able to patent their specialized
cultivation method or the machines utilized in the production of marijuana, and
the Mexican Cartel was to mimic Bill and Ted’s patented cultivation method or
employ Bill and Ted’s patented machine, such acts would also trigger section
337 relief under subsection (a)(1)(B).73
Copyright or Trademark infringement presents a more exceptional prospect
for establishing a cause of action. Copyright protection extends to package text,
artwork, labels, or even the manner in which facts are expressed so long as a
69. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); see Aleksey Khamin, America Invents Act’s Prior User
Defense: Lessons from Global Patent Regimes and Legislative History, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L.
POL’Y 132, 134 (2015).
70. Historically, the moral utility doctrine functioned as an ethical barrier to patent protection.
See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of
Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 687, 690–92 (2004). However, the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have
largely decreased reliance upon the doctrine, and many believe the doctrine today has no place in
American patent law. See id.
71. See Hilary Bricken, The Possiblity of Marijuana Plant Patents, ABOVE THE LAW (July 6,
2015, 4:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/07/the-possibility-of-marijuana-plant-patents/; see,
e.g., Cannabis Plant Named Erez, App. No. US14193197 (2014), pending (Google Patents),
https://patents.google.com/patent/US20140245494A1/en?q=marijuana&q=plant.
Plant patent
protection, compared to utility patents, has its limitations. See The Fifteenth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Washington, D.C. June
12, 1997, 180 F.R.D. 467, 542 (1998). A doctrine of equivalents theory of infringement is not
available; instead, actual derivation from the patent plant must be proven for infringement purposes.
See id.
72. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013) (“[I]f simple copying were
a protected use, a patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first item containing the
invention. The undiluted patent monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the
Patent Act promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in less incentive for
innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our repeated insistence that exhaustion applies only to
the particular item sold, and not to reproductions.”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (2012); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
73. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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“modicum of originality” exists.74 Marijuana sold in Colorado, as a condition
of licensing, requires appropriate packaging and conspicuous labels that
identifies sufficiently, among several other requirements, “[t]he license number
of the cultivation licensee . . . [a]n identity statement and standardized graphic
symbol . . . .”75 If Bill and Ted were to create packaging and a label “so as to
make them original to a specific author,” copyright protection would exist over
such a package and label.76 A nefarious distributor of unregulated marijuana
may forge Bill and Ted’s label or packaging to give the appearance of legitimacy
or to artificially raise the value of their inferior crop.
Trademark protection extends to “symbols, words, pictures, slogans, colors,
or virtually any other mark” that identifies the source of the good or service.77
Trademarks, similar to copyrights, would only tender relief under the intellectual
property prong of section 337 in situations following a rather specific fact
pattern.78 Nevertheless, one could expect trademark infringement in a similar
fact pattern to the copyright infringement example outlined above. Mexican
cartels would be motivated to misidentify their product as grown by Bill and
Ted, and would attempt to confuse consumers into believing their inferior
product originated from Bill and Ted.79

74. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see Michael Yang, Creative Classification: A Modicum of
Originality Provides Entry into the Domain of Copyright, 6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 95
(1997).
75. Adrian A. Ohmer, Investing in Cannabis: Inconsistent Government Regulation and
Constraints on Capital, 3 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 97, 121 n.166 (2013)
(citing a letter from Robert J. Corry, Jr., to Chairman and Members of the Joint Select Committee
on the Implementation of Amendment 64 Task Force Recommendations, Colorado General
Assembly, State Capitol 21–22 (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.colorado.gov/clics/clics2013a/
commsumm.nsf/b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670a71/e299e8e1e892b0d387257b36006925fd/$
FILE/130322%20AttachF.pdf).
76. Yang, supra note 74, at 95; see Gina S. Warren, Regulating Pot to Save the Polar Bear:
Energy and Climate Impacts of the Marijuana Industry, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385, 418 (2015).
77. Melissa Ann Gauthier, The SJC and Dunkin’ Donuts: Squeezing the Filling Out of the
Small Franchisee, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 765 (2007) (stating that trademarks perform the
following functions: (1) they identify a seller’s goods or services and distinguish these from the
goods and services of other sellers; (2) they inform the purchaser that all goods or services bearing
the mark are from the same source; (3) they certify that all goods bearing the mark are of equal
quality; (4) they serve the owner as a form of advertising; and (5) they are a symbol of the
company’s goodwill).
78. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 33, at 168.
79. See Peter Robinson et al., America’s Quality Pot is Changing the Drug War, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 3, 2015, 6:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0603/quality-pot-is-changing-the-drug-war.
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B. A Violation of Section 337: The Importation of an Article
Section 337 does not define “articles.”80 Such statutory silence resulted in the
recent, highly debated, case ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. ITC, 81 which
forced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to ascertain whether
“articles” could include electronic transmissions. 82 The Federal Circuit,
practicing standard statutory interpretation procedures, analyzed several
contemporary dictionaries in determining the proper scope of the term
“article.”83 Each dictionary definition, restrictive or broad, suggests the term at
least encompasses material things. 84 A crop, such as marijuana, is clearly a
material thing. Further, crops have been recognized as an “article” under section
337, 85 and there does not appear to be any evidence that the term “article”
contemplates exclusion of materials considered by some to be immoral.86
Understanding that marijuana is an “article,” and that this article is being
imported into the United States, the only question that remains is whether there
is an efficiently and economically established domestic industry.
C. Domestic Industry
Section 337 relief can only be requested by, or on behalf of, a domestic
industry.87 Bill and Ted, therefore, can only seek remedy at the ITC if they have
an established, or are in the process of establishing, a domestic industry.
Pursuant to the intellectual property prong, a domestic industry is efficiently and
economically operating when, “with respect to the articles protected by the
patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned—(A) significant
investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or
capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation.”88 If Bill and Ted were
selling tomatoes instead of marijuana, there would be little debate as to whether
80. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, v. ITC, No. 2014-1527, at 13 (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.
cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1527.Opinion.11-6-2015.1.PDF.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 3.
83. See id. at 13–18.
84. See id.; see also Sapna Kumar, Guest Post: Digital Information at the Boarder, PATENTLY
O (July 28, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/digital-information-border.html.
85. See Eric P. Salonen, “One Tomato, Two Tomato . . .” Selection of Trade Remedy Laws in
the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 371, 385 (1997) (citing Fresh Winter
Tomatoes, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,119, 25,248 (May 11, 1995) (identifying an ITC investigation over
tomatoes)).
86. ClearCorrect, No. 2014-1527, at 13 (noting that the court definition does not contemplate
morality). See also Enerson, supra note 70, at 690–92 (observing that federal courts are becoming
less likely to apply morality standards when adjudicating infringement disputes).
87. See Chien, supra note 57, at 177 (stating that “the purpose of the Commission is to
adjudicate trade disputes between U.S. industries and those who seek to import goods from
abroad”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 100-40, pt. 1, at 157 (1987) (emphasis added)); Engler, supra note
38, at 10515.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2012).
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a domestic industry would be found to exist. However, the giant elephant
remaining in this hypothesis is whether a federal agency would recognize the
legitimacy of industry dedicated to the commercialization of marijuana. Given
the importance of section 337 economically, public policy favors using the ITC
to protect U.S. industries.89
The ITC was designed to “encourage the industries of the United States.”90
As one commentator suggests, the American desire to protect its domestic
industries is so grounded in tradition that it dates to the Boston Tea Party.91 The
availability of the ITC as a forum for relief secures for those jurisdictions opting
to the legalized cultivation, distribution, and sale of marijuana exactly the same
public policy considerations evaluated by those jurisdictions.92 The recognition
of Bill and Ted’s industry by the ITC does not sanction marijuana or even
legitimize it at the federal level. Rather, the ITC is simply protecting domestic
jobs, domestic innovation, and domestic commerce. Furthermore, if the ITC
were to recognize Bill and Ted’s industry, such an action would promote selfregulation within the legalized marijuana community, and foster more intimate
and individualized federal regulation of marijuana.
Such would also conflict with the cooperative federalism arrangement
currently entrenched. The U.S. Department of Justice indicated that the
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) remains a viable option in
jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana, but such would only occur if federal
“policy concerns about marijuana—e.g., the sale to minors, the diversion of
marijuana between states, and the involvement of organized crime”—were
unable to be addressed by the implementing jurisdictions.93 If the CSA were to
deny the availability of section 337 remedies to Bill and Ted, the federal
government would effectively destroy a valuable resource in the fight against
illicit foreign incursion and criminal enterprises that have invaded the market.
III. WHY WOULD BILL AND TED WANT TO ADJUDICATE THEIR CLAIMS AT THE
ITC?
The ITC offers unique and appealing adjudication procedures. It is
internationally renowned for its expeditious adjudication process. 94 A
congressional mandate, implementing regulations (19 C.F.R. Part 210), and
even section 337 incorporate and instill an ambitious policy that charges the
agency with conducting each stage of the adjudication process with upmost
89. Engler, supra note 38, at 10515.
90. See id.
91. See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 66 (2008).
92. See Engler, supra note 38, at 10516–17.
93. Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 85 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1105, 1110–11 (2014) (citing Deputy Attorney General James Cole’s letter identifying the
federal position following Washington and Colorado’s legalization of marijuana).
94. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 33, at 169.
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expedition. 95 Despite a congressional repeal of a mandatory deadline, the
average time to trial is seven to nine months, and a typical ITC investigation
concludes within twelve to sixteen months. 96 In addition to the expeditious
adjudicative process, the ITC imposes “few limitations on interrogatories,
document requests, depositions, and foreign discovery”; it grants more freely
and is more familiar with foreign discovery;97 it has nationwide subpoena power,
a massive advantage in compiling evidence given that the subpoena power of
federal courts is relatively limited by the constitution;98 and it relaxes the rule
against hearsay.99 Not only are litigants drawn to the ITC’s rapid adjudication
process and favorable evidentiary rules, but they are also seeking the
advantageous procedural and powerful remedial measures unique to the ITC.
First, the standard of proof for obtaining equitable relief in section 337
investigations is less than in federal courts.100 Federal courts, in consideration
of eBay v. MercExchange, 101 require a heightened standard of proof—
irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.102 ITC litigation, meanwhile,
only requires evidence of a violation of section 337.103 An exclusion order from
the ITC, accordingly, is easier to obtain than an injunction issued by a federal
district court.104
Second, the ITC is given broad discretion in issuing remedial orders in
fashioning a remedy “to ensure complete relief to the domestic industry.”105 The
statute, in fact, does not require personal jurisdiction over the foreign bad actor
95. See id. at 169–70.
96. See id. at 170; K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy, The Case for
Repealing Section 337, THE CATO INST., POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 708 5 (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA708.pdf.
97. Gonzalez et al., supra note 33, at 170. See also John C. Low, Finding the Right Tool for
the Job: Adequate Protection for Research Tool Patents in A Global Market?, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L
L. 345, 373 (2005).
98. See Yang Yu & Lei Zhang, Analysis of Enforcement Mechanism of Section 337 of the US
Tariff Act Through Perspective in Law and Economics, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 209, 211 (2012),
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/14077/1/JIPR%2017(3)%20209-217.pdf.
99. Barry D. Rein & John J. Normile, Enforcement of Patent Rights When Confronted with
Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 60, 63 n.21 (1995).
100. Matthew Duescher, Controlling the Patent Trolls: A Proposed Approach for Curbing
Abusive Section 337 Claims in the ITC, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 614, 618-19 (2014)
(stating that “[p]rior to eBay, injunctive relief for patent infringement was granted automatically
barring exceptional circumstances”).
101. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
102. See id. at 391 (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction).
103. Duescher, supra note 100, at 618–19.
104. Id. at 619.
105. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 33, at 173 (quoting Certain Hardware Logic Emulation
Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 3089 16 (Mar. 1998)).
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to issue a general exclusion order. 106 Rather, the ITC has the authority to
investigate any claim arising from the unfair importation of an article at the U.S.
border, and has the authority to issue an in rem remedy against articles whose
import constitutes unfair trade practice.107 In short, the agency’s jurisdiction
exists over the articles, not the actors.
Upon the determination that a violation of section 337 exists, the agency will
issue an exclusion order.108 Exclusion orders are either limited or general.109
The standard exclusion order applies, for notice purposes, only to those
respondents named in a particular complaint filed at the ITC—i.e., it is
limited. 110 In special circumstances, however, section 337 authorizes the
issuance of a general exclusion order.111 A general exclusion order is authorized
when “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify
the source of infringing products,” as would likely be the case in the black
market marijuana smuggling business.112 This designation affords the ITC the
ability to exclude all articles, irrespective of the source. 113 The international
reach of section 337 is especially vital to Bill and Ted because the primary
source of illegal marijuana is often uncertain. Section 337 also contains no
“minimum contacts” jurisdictional limitation—likely important, considering
preeminent individuals steering the illicit operation are less likely to be
intimately involved with the actual transport of marijuana. 114 There are no
distracting and expensive jurisdiction disputes. 115 There are no “stream of
commerce” uncertainties because complainants must work with the Customs
Bureau to identify “infringing products.”116 So long as products are transported
over the U.S. border, the ITC may investigate and impose remedies against those
products.117

106. Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 529, 535 (2009).
107. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1), (b)(1), (d)(1) (2012).
108. Id. § 1337(d)(2).
109. Kumar, supra note 106, at 537–38.
110. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(1).
111. Taras M. Czebiniak, When Congress Gives Two Hats, Which Do You Wear? Choosing
Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in S 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 102 (2011) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)).
112. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2)(B).
113. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 33, at 171.
114. Enercon GmbH v. ITC, 151 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is clear that neither the
language of section 337, nor traditional “minimum contacts” analysis inherently limits the
jurisdiction of the ITC to situations in which there has been a delivery of control of the goods to a
U.S. domiciliary intending to import them into the United States.”).
115. Steven E. Adkins, Protecting America’s Borders: Section 337 Intellectual Property
Investigations at the ITC, 13 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 1, 2 (2006).
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 3. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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These procedural and remedial advantages, in a case filed by a pair of
Colorado farmers against a Mexican Cartel, are significant considering that it is
highly unlikely that the Mexican Cartel is actually going to respond.118 A default
judgment would be entered and likely ignored. To anticipate this, Bill and Ted
could request in the complaint that a general exclusion order be issued, even in
default judgment, when a violation of section 337 “is established by substantial,
reliable, and probative evidence.”119
Lastly, while the ITC cannot award monetary damages in the event an
exclusion order is violated,120 subsection (f)(2) provides that recipients of ceaseand-desist orders are subject to potentially massive civil penalties.121 Ceaseand-desist orders are designed to “limit[] sales of infringing products already
imported” and provide an avenue that allows complainants to recover monetary
damages on behalf of the ITC.122 Section 337 does not provide guidance on
issuing cease-and-desist orders, nor are there any “regulatory justification[s]”
for when the ITC issues one.123 Rather, the ITC relies mostly on precedent,
issuing cease-and-desist orders, even in instances of default judgment, “only in
cases where a respondent has ‘commercially significant’ inventories of
infringing products.”124 Nevertheless, these civil penalties are a powerful tool
when implemented, “increase[ing] the efficiency and speed of ITC remedies[,]
lower[ing] the costs of ITC litigation[,]” and acting as a powerful deterrent.125
They are calculated to be the “greater of $100,000 or twice the domestic value
of the articles entered or sold on such day in violation of the order,” and may be
recovered by the complainant in a civil action filed in federal district court.126
The powerful general exclusion order broadly drafted against all imported
marijuana, coupled with massive statutory civil damages imposed upon entities
and individuals not typically considered to have availed themselves to personal
jurisdiction in the United States, provides Bill and Ted with a unique form of
remedial relief.
118. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(a) (2013) (failing to respond to the complaint and notice of
investigation results in default). In cases of default, the “facts alleged in the complaint will be
presumed to be true,” and the ITC “may issue an exclusion order, a cease and desist order, or both.”
19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c). These equitable remedies are only available after the ITC considers the
public health and welfare of U.S. consumers, among other public interest factors. See 19 C.F.R. §
210.16(c).
119. Id. at 19 C.F.R. § 210.16(c)(2).
120. See Timothy Q. Li, Exclusion Is Not Automatic: Improving the Enforcement of ITC
Exclusion Orders Through Notice, A Test for Close Cases, and Civil Penalties, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1755, 1760 (2013).
121. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2).
122. Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337’s Domestic Industry Requirement for the
Global Economy, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 41, 45 (2009); Li, supra note 120, at 1760.
123. Li, supra note 120, at 1777–78.
124. Id. at 1777–78, 1780.
125. Id. at 1781–82.
126. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2).
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CONCLUSION
The ITC more than complements federal criminal and civil actions. It imparts
distinctive and beneficial evidentiary procedures, and it is known for its
expeditious litigation process. Because its organic statute embraces a broad
mechanism designed to combat any unfair trade practices in the importation of
articles, a local and otherwise legitimate marijuana farmer is not forced to rely
upon federal statutes—laws marijuana farmers themselves violate. Despite the
evils associated with marijuana use, a number of jurisdictions determined public
policy favors legalization. These policy considerations should not concern the
ITC. Instead, the ITC should acknowledge that policing drugs and narcotics is
a battle best left to the individual states, and where a state has legitimized a
particular industry, the ITC should recognize that industry in consideration of its
justifiability doctrines.
The ITC is not forced to condone marijuana cultivation practices, nor is it
forced to condone the practice of marijuana cultivation and ingestion. The ITC,
instead, is simply tasked with advancing its foundational objective: protect
domestic jobs, domestic innovation, and domestic commerce. As marijuana
regulations continue to become more local and individualistic, the use of section
337 to enforce domestic interests abroad will embolden and reward individuals
seeking to destroy noncompliant market participants. Closing this door would
only to inhibit states and their respective constituents' ability to self regulate the
market—an unfavorable outcome for all parties involved. Section 337 is unique
because it empowers individuals to advance U.S. commercial interests. Because
the ITC is known for its familiarity with international discovery and is capable
of providing meaningful and rapid relief, section 337 would serve as a powerful
tool for individuals to advance the shared interest of eradicating marijuana
imported into the United States.

